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SEX CHANGES EVERYTHING, BUT THE TRADEMARK 
DILUTION REVISION ACT SHOULDN’T: V SECRET 
CATALOGUE, INC. V. MOSELEY AND THE BURDEN OF 
PROOF IN TRADEMARK DILUTION ACTIONS 
Greg Horn* & Matthew Malm** 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In 1998, an advertisement ran in a weekly publication distributed to 
the residents of Fort Knox, Kentucky declaring the “GRAND OPENING 
Just in time for Valentine’s Day” of a new store called “VICTOR’S 
SECRET” in nearby Elizabethtown, Kentucky.1  According to the 
advertisement, the store would be selling: “Intimate Lingerie for every 
woman,” “Romantic Lighting,” “Lycra Dresses,” “Pagers,” and “Adult 
Novelties/Gifts.”2 
The advertisement offended an army colonel (the Colonel) residing at 
Fort Knox, and he sent a copy of the advertisement and a letter to the 
owners of the “Victoria’s Secret” trademark, V Secret Catalogue Inc. 
(Victoria’s Secret).  The letter indicated the Colonel’s belief that 
Victor’s Secret used Victoria’s Secret’s “trademark to promote the sale 
of ‘unwholesome, tawdry merchandise.’”3  Later, in an affidavit, the 
Colonel stated that his wife and daughter shop at Victoria’s Secret, and 
he was “dismayed by [the] defendant’s effort to associate itself with, 
trade off on the image of, and in fact denigrate a store frequented by 
members of [his] family.”4  The owners of the store, the Moseleys, 
changed the name of their store to “Victor’s Little Secret,” but this 
 * Contributing Editor, 2010–2011, University of Cincinnati Law Review; University of 
Cincinnati College of Law, J.D. expected May 2011; Miami University, B.S. Business, 2008.  This 
author would like to thank the owners and staff of Uncle Woody’s for tolerating him doing all of his 
work there.  In addition, this author would like to thank the editorial staff of the Law Review for their 
efforts. 
 ** Contributing Editor, 2010–2011, University of Cincinnati Law Review; University of 
Cincinnati College of Law, J.D. expected May 2011; University of Cincinnati, B.A. Economics, 2008.  
This author would like to thank his mother for her unwavering support as well as the editorial staff for 
their insights. 
 1. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 423 (2003). 
 2. Id. 
 3. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 386 n.3 (6th Cir. 2010) (quoting the 
Colonel’s letter), cert. denied, 79 U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2011) (No. 10-604). 
 4. Id. at 391. 
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change did not satisfy Victoria’s Secret.5 
The Colonel’s letter spurred litigation that was in the federal court 
system ten years before a resolution was reached.  Victoria’s Secret 
initially brought suit in the federal District Court for the Western District 
of Kentucky, alleging that the Moseleys infringed on its trademark and 
also diluted the distinctiveness of its trademark.6  The district court 
granted summary judgment for the Moseleys on the infringement claim 
because it found consumers were not likely to confuse the name 
“Victoria’s Secret” with the name “Victor’s Little Secret.”7  This is 
because, according to the court, consumers were unlikely to associate 
Victoria’s Secret products with those available in the Moseleys’ store.8  
The district court did, however, find that the use of “Victor’s Little 
Secret” was likely to dilute Victoria’s Secret trademark.9  This was 
because, according to the court, the distinctiveness of the trademark and 
the reputation behind the mark were likely to be diminished by the use 
of a phrase so similar to “Victoria’s Secret.” 
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s 
decision and reiterated that Victoria’s Secret only needed to show a 
“likelihood of dilution” of its trademark’s distinctiveness.10  The United 
States Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that a plaintiff 
seeking an injunction for dilution must show “actual dilution.”11  After 
the Supreme Court’s decision, Congress passed the Trademark Dilution 
Revision Act (TDRA), which stated that only a “likelihood of dilution” 
need be shown.  On remand, the district court found a likelihood of 
dilution.12  The Sixth Circuit, in the case that is the focus of this 
Casenote, affirmed,13 but it also held that when a defendant’s trademark 
has lewd or sexual associations a “likelihood of dilution” is presumed 
and must be rebutted by the defendant.14  This burden shift was 
unprecedented. 
 5. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, No. 3:98CV-395-S, 2000 WL 370525, at *1 (W.D. Ky. 
Feb. 9, 2000). 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. at *4. 
 8. It is not likely that a consumer will think Victor’s Secret is a male-centric offshoot of the 
Victoria’s Secret retail chain. 
 9. Moseley, 2000 WL 370525, at *6. 
 10. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 476–77 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 11. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 433 (2003), superseded by statute, 
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730, as recognized in 
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 477 F.3d 765 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 12. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 558 F. Supp. 2d 734, 750 (W.D. Ky. 2008). 
 13. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 390 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 79 
U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2011) (No. 10-604). 
 14. Id. at 389. 
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This Casenote discusses the Sixth Circuit’s recent decision in V Secret 
Catalogue v. Moseley and argues that it is setting an unacceptable 
precedent.  Additionally, this Casenote argues that the Sixth Circuit 
should have used a narrow interpretation of the TDRA and, therefore, 
should not have shifted the burden of proof.  Part II describes trademark 
dilution generally and the federal statutes prohibiting it.  Part III outlines 
the procedural history of V Secret Catalogue v. Moseley.  Next, Part IV 
analyzes the Sixth Circuit’s 2010 decision in more detail.  Finally, Part 
V demonstrates that the Sixth Circuit’s decision is unfavorable and why 
a narrow interpretation of the TDRA would have produced a better 
outcome.  Prospectively, this Casenote is intended to provide courts 
interpreting the TDRA with some additional considerations. 
II. TRADEMARK DILUTION 
The history of trademark dilution law extends over an eighty year 
period.  During this period, the law evolved from an abstract idea in a 
law review article into a federal statute.  The following provides a brief 
description of this evolution and discusses the substantive aspects of 
federal dilution law. 
A. Origins of Trademark Dilution Law 
The theory of trademark dilution originated in The Rational Basis of 
Trademark Protection by Frank Schechter.15  Schechter contended that 
“the true harm of diluting junior marks”16 was not consumer confusion 
but “the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the identity and hold 
upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-
competing goods.”17  Accordingly, Schechter felt the only rational basis 
for a trademark’s protection should be the preservation of its 
uniqueness.18 
Schechter’s proposal remained a purely academic consideration until 
1947 when Massachusetts passed a statute protecting trademarks from 
dilution.19  By 1996, twenty-eight states had adopted antidilution  
statutes and at least one had recognized antidilution protection as part of 
 15. Frank Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. REV. 813 (1927). 
 16. A junior mark is created when a trademark is used by a second (or subsequent) person.  
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW DICTIONARY part III-31 (13th ed. 2011).  A senior mark is the first user 
of a mark and has superior rights to all others.  Id. at part III-41. 
 17. Schechter, supra note 15, at 825. 
 18. Id. at 831. 
 19. Robert N. Klieger, Trademark Dilution: The Whittling Away of the Rational Basis for 
Trademark Protection, 58 U. PITT. L. REV. 789, 811 (1997). 
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its common law.20 
The fact that trademarks had a national scope and that antidilution 
statutes only extended as far as the borders of the state in which they 
were enacted posed significant problems.  First, the statutes varied 
widely in the standards required to prove dilution.21  Second, many 
statutes defined the category of trademarks protected against dilution 
solely by reference to their “distinctive quality,” which left many 
trademarks unprotected.22  Third, a likelihood of dilution was actionable 
under many statutes.23  Fourth, many statutes considered the harm to be 
damage to a senior mark’s distinctiveness rather than economic harm to 
the holder of the senior mark.  Fifth, injunctive relief was the only 
potential remedy against the use of a junior mark under many statutes.24  
Finally, the injunctions were only statewide.  A solution to these border-
specific remedies was to provide national protection under a federal 
statute.25 
B. Trademark Dilution Receives a Federal Mandate 
In 1995, H.R. 1295 was introduced and the Subcommittee on Courts 
and Intellectual Property of the House Judiciary Committee held a one-
day hearing on it.26  The committee’s report stated that the “purpose of 
H.R. 1295 is to protect famous trademarks from subsequent uses that 
blur the distinctiveness of the mark or tarnish or disparage it, even in the 
absence of a likelihood of confusion.”27  The Senate took up the House 
bill by unanimous consent and without debate, passed it on a voice vote 
on December 29, 1995.28  In 1996, this bill became the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act (FTDA), which made dilution law enforceable 
on a nationwide level. 
The FTDA entitled the owner of a famous trademark “to an injunction 
against another person’s commercial use in commerce of a mark or trade 
name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous and causes 
dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark.”29  Dilution was described 
 20. Id. 
 21. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374, at 2 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 1032. 
 22. Ringling Bros.–Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 
F.3d 449, 454 (4th Cir. 1999). 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
 25. Id. 
 26. H.R. REP. NO. 104-374. 
 27. Id. at 2. 
 28. Trademark Dilution Bill Cleared for White House, Daily Report for Executives, Jan. 3, 1996. 
 29. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006). 
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in the statute as “the lessening of the capacity of a famous mark to 
identify and distinguish goods or services, regardless of the presence or 
absence of (1) competition between the owner of the famous mark and 
other parties, or (2) likelihood of confusion, mistake or deception.”30  A 
trademark was deemed famous if it was widely recognized by the 
consuming public as a designation of the source of the goods or services.  
This was determined by the extent of the trademark owner’s advertising, 
the extent of the sales of the goods and services under the trademark, 
actual recognition of the trademark, and how the trademark was 
registered.31 
C. Congress Amends the FTDA with the Trademark Dilution Revision 
Act 
The federal circuit courts were split over the proper interpretation of 
the FTDA’s requirement that a plaintiff seeking an injunction show that 
another’s use of its trademark “causes dilution of the distinctive quality 
of [that] mark.”32  Some circuit courts interpreted this provision to 
require only a likelihood of dilution,33 while others interpreted it to 
require actual dilution.34  As discussed further in the next Part, the 
Supreme Court resolved this circuit split in Moseley v. V Secret 
Catalogue, Inc.35  In Moseley, the Supreme Court concluded that the 
FTDA required a showing of actual dilution.36 
In 2006, Congress, due to unhappiness with the actual dilution 
standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Moseley, amended the 
FTDA.  The new law, the TDRA, required only a likelihood of dilution.  
The TDRA provides: 
 Subject to the principles of equity, the owner of a famous mark that is 
distinctive, inherently or through acquired distinctiveness, shall be 
entitled to an injunction against another person who, at any time after the 
owner’s mark has become famous, commences use of a mark or trade 
name in commerce that is likely to cause dilution by blurring or dilution 
 30. 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006). 
 31. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(2)(A)(i)–(iv). 
 32. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 428 (2003), superseded by statute, 
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730, as recognized in 
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 477 F.3d 765 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 33. Ringling Bros.–Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 
F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999); Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000). 
 34. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999); V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. 
Moseley, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 35. 537 U.S. 418. 
 36. Id. 
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by tarnishment of the famous mark, regardless of the presence or absence 
of actual or likely confusion, of competition, or of actual economic 
injury.37 
Furthermore, the TDRA defines “dilution by blurring” as an “association 
arising from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous 
mark that impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”38  The TDRA 
gives a non-exclusive list of factors a court should consider in 
determining whether there is dilution by blurring: (1) the degree of 
similarity between the mark or trade name and the famous trademark; 
(2) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the famous 
trademark; (3) the extent to which the owner of the famous trademark is 
engaging in substantially exclusive use of that trademark; (4) the degree 
of recognition of the famous trademark in the marketplace; (5) whether 
the user of the mark or trade name intended to create an association with 
the famous trademark; and (6) whether there was any actual association 
between the mark or trade name and the famous trademark.39 
“Tarnishment” under the TDRA is defined as an association arising 
from the similarity between a mark or trade name and a famous 
trademark that impairs the reputation of the famous mark.40  While 
similar, blurring is mainly concerned with protecting famous 
trademarks’ distinctive characteristics, which are helpful for 
distinguishing their products and services in the marketplace, while 
tarnishment is mainly concerned with the reputational aspect of owners 
not wanting their famous trademark associated with something that is 
considered unwholesome.41 
 37. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 38. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(B). 
 39. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(B)(i)–(vi). 
 40. Id. § 1125(c)(2)(C). 
 41. See Pfizer Inc. v. Sachs, 652 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2009) (noting that defendants’ 
display at an adult entertainment exhibition of two models riding a VIAGRA-branded missile and 
distributing condoms would likely harm the reputation of Pfizer’s trademark); Williams-Sonoma, Inc. v. 
Friendfinder, Inc., No. C 06-6572 JSW (MEJ), 2007 WL 4973848, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2007) 
(noting that defendants’ use of the POTTERY BARN trademark on their sexually-oriented websites 
likely to tarnish “by associating those marks for children and teenager furnishings”); Kraft Foods 
Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 949–50 (N.D. Ill. 2002) (noting that pornographic 
website’s use of “VelVeeda” tarnishes VELVEETA trademark); Victoria’s Cyber Secret Ltd. P’ship v. 
V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2001) (noting that defendants’ internet 
trade names likely to tarnish famous trademark when websites “will be used for entertainment of a 
lascivious nature suitable only for adults”); Mattel, Inc. v. Internet Dimensions Inc., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 
1620, 1627 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (linking BARBIE with pornography will adversely color the public’s 
impressions of BARBIE); Polo Ralph Lauren L.P. v. Schuman, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d 1046, 1048 (S.D. Tex. 
1998) (noting that defendants’ use of “The Polo Club” or “Polo Executive Retreat” as an adult 
entertainment club tarnished POLO trademark); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 
124, 135 (N.D. Ga. 1981) (noting that defendant’s sexually-oriented variation of the PILLSBURY 
6
University of Cincinnati Law Review, Vol. 79, Iss. 4 [2011], Art. 8
https://scholarship.law.uc.edu/uclr/vol79/iss4/8
L-HORN-MALM 9/24/2011  2:43:32 PM 
2011] BURDEN OF PROOF FOR TRADEMARK DILUTION 1589 
 
Courts often look to the Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition 
(the Restatement) for support in resolving antidilution issues.  According 
to the Restatement, antidilution statutes are designed to protect 
trademark owners from two general threats.42  First, a distinctive 
trademark can be a powerful selling tool when the trademark brings a 
positive association between the trademark and the goods or services 
sold by the trademark’s owner.43  When other people use the trademark, 
it blurs the effect of that positive connotation harming the use of the 
trademark as a selling tool.44  The second threat is similar to the first, in 
that when a trademark is used with goods or services, such as 
pornography, that use may tarnish the trademark’s image and thereby 
lessen its value as a selling tool.45 
In Part III, the procedural history of the Moseley litigation will show 
how the TDRA has changed the law regarding dilution by showing how 
the case proceeded to the Supreme Court pre-TDRA and how the courts 
treated the claim on remand post-TDRA. 
III. PROCEDURAL HISTORY BEFORE V SECRET CATALOGUE, INC. V. 
MOSELEY 
A. The Facts 
Victoria’s Secret has owned its trademark since 1981.46  They sell a 
wide array of lingerie, clothing, and other accessories geared towards 
women.47  Victoria’s Secret operates over 750 stores nationwide and the 
Victoria’s Secret Catalogue distributes 400 million copies each year, 
including 39,000 in Elizabethtown, Kentucky.48  They spent over $55 
million in 1998 on advertising and were ranked the ninth most famous 
brand in the apparel industry.49  In February 1998, the Moseleys opened 
“Victor’s Secret” in Elizabethtown, Kentucky, selling a wide variety of 
DOUGHBOY tarnished plaintiff’s trademark); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Pussycat Cinema, 
Ltd., 467 F. Supp. 366, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (noting that pornographic depiction of a Dallas Cowboys 
Cheerleader-style cheerleader in an adult film tarnished the professional mark of the Dallas Cowboys). 
 42. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 25(c) (1995). 
 43. Id. § 25 cmt. (b). 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id.; see also id. at (g). 
 46. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, No. 3:98CV-395-S, 2000 WL 370525, at *1 (W.D. Ky. 
Feb. 9, 2000); U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, http://tess2.uspto.gov/, serial number 73159253, 
registration number 1146199. 
 47. V Secret, 2000 WL 370525, at *1; Victoria’s Secret, Careers, 
http://www.victoriassecret.com/CustomerService/Company/Careers (last visited Feb. 8, 2011). 
 48. V Secret, 2000 WL 370525, at *1. 
 49. Id. 
7
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items, including men’s and women’s lingerie, adult videos, sex toys, and 
“adult” novelties.  Two Victoria’s Secret stores were located within 
sixty miles of the Moseleys’ store.50 
The Moseleys placed an advertisement in a weekly publication 
distributed to residents of Fort Knox, Kentucky.  They advertised the 
“GRAND OPENING Just in time for Valentine’s Day!” of their store 
Victor’s Secret in nearby Elizabethtown.51  The ad featured “Intimate 
Lingerie for every woman,” “Romantic Lighting,” “Lycra Dresses,” 
“Pagers,” and “Adult Novelties/Gifts.”52  An army colonel who saw the 
advertisement, was “offended by what he perceived to be an attempt to 
use a reputable company’s trademark to promote the sale of 
‘unwholesome, tawdry merchandise’ sent a copy of the ad, along with a 
letter, to Victoria’s Secret.”53 
B. Procedural History 
1. Moseley I 
On February 25, 1998, the Moseleys received a cease and desist letter 
from Victoria’s Secret.54  The Moseleys subsequently changed the store 
name to “Victor’s Little Secret,” but Victoria’s Secret found that change 
unsatisfactory and filed suit in the Federal District Court for the Western 
District of Kentucky.55  Victoria’s Secret brought suit pursuant to the 
Lanham Act (15 U.S.C § 1051), the FTDA, and Kentucky common law, 
alleging that the Moseleys committed trademark infringement and unfair 
competition.56  Only the FTDA claim will be discussed here, however, 
as the other claims are not relevant. 
Under the FTDA, to prove a dilution claim a plaintiff must show: (1) 
its trademark is famous; (2) the defendant is making a commercial use of 
its trademark in commerce; (3) the defendant’s use of its mark came 
after the plaintiff’s trademark became famous; and (4) the defendant’s 
use of its mark dilutes the quality of the plaintiff’s trademark.57  In the 
case sub judice, the only disputed element was whether the Moseleys 
use of their mark diluted the quality of the plaintiff’s trademark.  The 
 50. Id. 
 51. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 423 (2003). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. V Secret, 2000 WL 370525, at *1. 
 55. Id. at *5. 
 56. Id. at *1. 
 57. Id. at *5 (citing Panavision Int’l, L.P. v. Toeppen, 141 F.3d 1316, 1324 (9th Cir. 1998)). 
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district court held there was trademark dilution for two reasons.58 
First, the court found that the two marks were sufficiently similar to 
cause dilution by blurring.59  According to the court, the Moseleys’ 
subsequent change to “Victor’s Little Secret” was not sufficient to 
distinguish their mark from Victoria’s Secret’s trademark because an 
examination of their signage and advertising revealed that their 
alteration was very minor.60  The word “Little” was substantially smaller 
than the words “Victor’s” and “Secret,” and the court called it “an 
afterthought in the advertising.”61 
Second, the court found that the similarity in the marks, combined 
with the fact that the Moseleys’ mark was associated with unsavory 
goods, caused dilution of Victoria’s Secrets trademark by tarnishment.62  
The court declared that while the Moseleys’ inventory (specifically the 
sex toys) may not be unsavory to all, its more risqué quality widely 
differentiated it from Victoria’s Secret.  On those grounds, the court 
granted summary judgment and enjoined the Moseleys from using the 
mark “Victor’s Little Secret” on the basis that it caused dilution of the 
distinctive quality of the Victoria’s Secret trademark.63 
2. Moseley II 
On appeal to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Moseleys 
contended that the entry of summary judgment resulted from the district 
court’s faulty analysis of the dilution question and from the court’s 
failure to require proof of actual economic loss.64  Prior to the Sixth 
Circuit hearing the appeal, but after the district court’s judgment, the 
Sixth Circuit adopted a five-factor test for establishing a dilution claim.  
The test was essentially the same as the four-factor test used by the 
district court, but the new test required the plaintiff to prove that its 
trademark was not only famous, but also distinctive.65  A trademark is 
distinctive based on inherent qualities of the mark, the extent and 
duration of its use in connection with goods or services, advertising and 
publicity of the mark, the geographic area in which the mark is used, and 
the channels of trade in which the mark is used and the recognition of 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at *6. 
 63. Id. 
 64. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464, 466 (6th Cir. 2001). 
 65. Id. at 469.  “‘Distinctiveness’ is not only a statutory element, it also has a considerable 
bearing on the question of whether the junior use will have a diluting effect.”  Id. at 470 n.2. 
9
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the mark within those channels of trade.66 
The Sixth Circuit noted that there was a circuit split over whether a 
plaintiff had to show actual dilution or just likelihood of harm to sustain 
a trademark dilution claim.67  The court held that the “likelihood of 
harm” standard was the correct standard because it found that “‘dilution 
is an infection, which if allowed to spread, will inevitably destroy the 
advertising value of the mark.’”68  According to the court, this passage 
from H.R. Rep. No. 104-374 shows congressional intent to provide a 
“broad remedy for the lesser trademark violation of dilution and 
recognized that the essence of the dilution claim is a property right in the 
‘potency’ of a mark,” and “evinces an intent to allow a remedy before 
dilution has actually caused economic harm to the senior mark.”69 
The court noted that requiring proof of actual dilution would be 
extremely difficult and would be disastrous to the junior mark’s owner 
“who wanted to test the propriety of a new mark before launching it in 
the marketplace.”70  The court reasoned that if actual dilution was 
required “the owner of a junior mark would have to wait until after they 
had spent the resources involved in establishing a trademark in 
consumers’ minds before they could even find out if their mark was 
improper.”71 
3. Moseley III: The Case Makes It to the Supreme Court 
The Supreme Court addressed the circuit split over whether the FTDA 
required proof of actual dilution or just a likelihood of dilution.72  The 
Court first distinguished dilution from traditional infringement law by 
finding that “unlike traditional infringement law, the prohibitions against 
trademark dilution are not the product of common-law development, and 
are not motivated by an interest in protecting consumers.”73 
In holding that the FTDA required a showing of actual harm rather 
than a likelihood of harm, the Court distinguished between federal law 
and state antidilution statutes.  Specifically, many state statutes 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. at 474–75. 
 68. Id. at 475 (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 104-374 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 
1032). 
 69. Id. at 475–76. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 421–22 (2003), superseded by statute, 
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730, as recognized in 
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 477 F.3d 765 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 73. Id. at 429. 
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explicitly provided relief where there was a likelihood of harm, rather 
than a completed harm.74  The FTDA, however, only mentions that a 
trademark owner is entitled to injunctive relief when another party’s use 
of a mark “‘causes dilution of the distinctive quality’ of the famous 
mark.”75 
In dicta, the Court noted that when marks are not identical, the mere 
fact that consumers mentally associate the junior user’s mark with a 
famous trademark is not sufficient to establish actionable dilution.76  
The Court found that mere mental association will not necessarily 
reduce the capacity of the famous trademark to identify the goods of its 
owner, which is the statutory requirement for dilution under the 
FTDA.77  Furthermore, the Court found that blurring and tarnishment 
were not a necessary consequence of the mere mental asso 78
As applied to the facts of the case, the Court found that the army 
officer who saw the advertisement of the opening of a store named 
“Victor’s Secret” did make the mental association with “Victoria’s 
Secret,” but it also showed that he did not form any different impression 
of the store that his wife and daughter patronized.79  There was no 
evidence of any lessening of the capacity of the Victoria’s Secret 
trademark to identify and distinguish its goods or services.80  The officer 
was offended by the advertisement, but it did not change his perception 
of Victoria’s Secret.  His offense was directed entirely at the Moseleys.81 
4. Congress Intervenes 
After the Court entered its mandate on April 3, 2003, it remanded the 
case to the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals.82  On April 9, 2003, the 
Moseleys filed a motion in the Sixth Circuit to vacate the injunction, and 
Victoria’s Secret filed a response.  On July 26, 2007, more than four 
years later, the Sixth Circuit finally remanded the case back to the 
District Court for the Western District of Kentucky.  By this time, 
Congress has enacted the TDRA.83 
Unhappy with the Supreme Court’s decision in Mosesly, Congress 
 74. Id. at 432 (some sections of Lanham Act also refer to likelihood of harm). 
 75. Id. at 432–33 (emphasis added) (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)). 
 76. Id. at 433. 
 77. Id. 
 78. Id. at 434. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Id. 
 82. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 558 F. Supp. 2d 734, 737 (W.D. Ky. 2008). 
 83. Id. 
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amended the FTDA with the TDRA, which  only required a likelihood 
of dilution to succeed on a claim.84  As discussed in Part II, the TDRA 
provides that: 
the owner of a famous mark that is distinctive, inherently or through 
acquired distinctiveness, shall be entitled to an injunction against another 
person who, at any time after the owner’s mark has become famous, 
commences use of a mark or trade name in commerce that is likely to 
cause dilution by blurring or dilution by tarnishment of the famous mark, 
regardless of the presence or absence of actual or likely confusion, of 
competition, or of actual economic injury.85 
5. Moseley V: The Case Returns to the District Court 
The Federal District Court for the Western District of Kentucky found 
that the TDRA was the controlling authority.86  The district court found 
there was no dilution by blurring because it is “defined as an association 
arising from the similarity between a mark and a famous mark that 
impairs the distinctiveness of the famous mark.”87  And there was no 
such association here because the only evidence proffered was the 
Colonel’s letter.  In this letter, the Colonel did indicate that he perceived 
an association between the marks;88 however, the Colonel also indicated 
he was aware the two entities had no connection beyond the similarity of 
the names.89  The court suggested that while dilution by blurring could 
occur under similar circumstances, the evidence here did not show a 
likelihood of it occurring.90 
The district court did, however, find that there could be a likelihood 
of dilution by tarnishment.91  Dilution by tarnishment is an “‘association 
arising from the similarity between a mark . . . and a famous mark that 
harms the reputation of the famous mark.’”92  Here, the army Colonel 
was offended by what he perceived to be a bastardization of Victoria’s 
Secret’s trademark for the sale of unwholesome, tawdry merchandise.93  
According to the court, the Colonel’s reaction suggested that there was a 
 84. Louis Vuitton Malletier v. Haute Diggity Dog, LLC, 507 F.3d 252, 264 n.2 (4th Cir. 2007). 
 85. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006) (emphasis added). 
 86. Moseley, 558 F. Supp. 2d at 737–38. 
 87. Id. at 748. 
 88. Id. 
 89. See id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. at 750. 
 92. Id. at 742 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2006)). 
 93. Id. at 750. 
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likelihood Victoria’s Secret’s reputation would be tarnished. 
C. Moseley VI: The Decision 
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit faced the sole issue of whether there was 
dilution by tarnishment.94  The Sixth Circuit concluded that the TDRA 
“creates a kind of rebuttable presumption, or at least a very strong 
inference, that a new mark used to sell sex related products is likely to 
tarnish a famous mark if there is a clear semantic association between 
the two” and that presumption had not been rebutted.95  In support of the 
creation of this rebuttable presumption, the court looked at a House 
Judiciary Report that stated that “the Moseley standard creates an undue 
burden” and concluded that this called for “special attention to the 
‘burden’ of proof or persuasion placed on ‘trademark holders’ by the 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Moseley, suggesting a possible modification 
in the burden of proof.”96  Additionally, the Sixth Circuit noted a 
growing body of case law, aided by the Restatement (especially 
subsection g), “that the creation of an ‘association’ between a famous 
mark and a lewd or bawdy sexual activity disparages and defiles the 
famous mark and reduces the commercial value of its selling power.”97 
In light of this, the Sixth Circuit held that any “new mark with a lewd 
or offensive-to-some sexual association” creates a rebuttable 
presumption, or a very strong inference, of tarnishment.98  The court 
compared this to a res ipsa loquitur type of effect,99 where, although not 
conclusive, the new mark owner provide some evidence showing that 
there is not a likelihood of tarnishment in order to prevail.100  The court 
went on to list examples of what types of evidence could be offered by a 
defendant, such as polls, customer surveys, and expert testimony.101  
The fact that the Moseleys did not provide any evidence rebutting the 
presumption, especially in light of Congress’s dissatisfaction with 
Moseley, supported the conclusion that the “present record—in the eyes 
 94. V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 605 F.3d 382, 384 (6th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 79 
U.S.L.W. 3301 (U.S. Jan. 18, 2011) (No. 10-604). 
 95. Id. at 385.  This is not the only way the court formulates the standard.  The alternative, and 
more expansive, formulation is mentioned in the first sentence of the next paragraph. 
 96. Id. at 387. 
 97. Id. at 387–88. 
 98. Id. at 388–89. 
 99. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine applies when by the very nature of the circumstances—in the 
Moseley case two similar marks with some overlap in goods offered—an outcome is likely—in the 
Moseley case the dilution of the senior mark. 
 100. Moseley, 605 F.3d at 388–89. 
 101. Id. 
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of the legislative branch—show[ed] a likelihood of tarnishment.”102 
The concurring opinion disagreed with the creation of a rebuttable 
presumption of dilution.103  Instead, because the TDRA was new law 
and because of the vagueness of the legislative history regarding the 
burden of proof, the concurrence argued that the rebuttable presumption 
should simply be treated as an inference.104 
The dissent disagreed and argued that the burden should be on the 
plaintiff and that in the current case, the burden was not met.105  The 
dissent also argued that the “undue burden” that Congress felt Moseley 
created was more reasonably interpreted to mean a lightening of the 
evidentiary burden from actual harm to likelihood of harm, rather than a 
shifting of the burden from the plaintiff to the defendant.106  The dissent 
stated that most of the cases cited by the majority in support of a 
presumption were distinguishable because in those cases the products 
sold by the senior mark were easily distinguishable from those sold by 
the junior mark.107  Finally, the dissent argued that the presumption of 
dilution could lead to illogical results.  As an example, the dissent 
pondered what would happen if the holder of a sex-related trademark 
brought a dilution claim against a junior sex-related mark.  The dissent 
argued that there would still be a presumption of tarnishment despite the 
similar sexual nature of both marks.108  The dissent found this 
unacceptable because it would be illogical to assume that a junior mark 
could tarnish a senior mark of an equally sexual nature.109 
IV. DISCUSSION 
This Part discusses three significant reasons why the Sixth Circuit 
should not have shifted the burden to the defendant in dilution by 
tarnishment cases where the junior mark has lewd or sexual associations.  
Additionally, it demonstrates why a narrow interpretation of the TDRA 
would have been more appropriate.  Subpart A explains how the Sixth 
Circuit’s approach to dilution cases is inconsistent with the Supreme 
Court’s approach.  Subpart B demonstrates that the Sixth Circuit’s 
decision increases the potential for harm to consumers.  Finally, 
 102. Id. at 389. 
 103. Id. at 390 (Gibbons, J., concurring). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id. at 391 (Moore, J., dissenting). 
 106. Id. at 391 n.2. 
 107. Id. at 394. 
 108. Id. at 395 n.5. 
 109. Id. 
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subpart C discusses other negative consequences of placing the burden 
on the defendant. 
A. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision Is Not Consistent with an Important Part 
of the Supreme Court’s Decision in Moseley that Was Not Affected by 
the TDRA 
The following excerpt from a House Judiciary Committee Report 
states the purpose of the TDRA: 
The Moseley standard creates an undue burden for trademark holders who 
contest diluting uses and should be revised. 
. . . . 
. . . The new language in the legislation [provides] specifically that the 
standard for proving a dilution claim is “likelihood of dilution” and that 
both dilution by blurring and dilution by tarnishment are actionable.110 
The Committee Report shows that Congress intended the TDRA to 
make one specific change to the Moseley decision; that is, it was enacted 
to reduce the burden of proof from actual dilution to a likelihood of 
dilution.  The Supreme Court’s decision in Moseley III, however, did 
more than just require the plaintiff to prove actual dilution.  It also 
offered guidance on how to determine whether dilution exists or even if 
it has the potential to exist.  For instance, the Court stated that dilution is 
not “a necessary consequence of a mental association” between a junior 
and senior mark.111  Even though the Supreme Court made this 
statement in an opinion that adopted an “actual dilution” standard, this 
statement is equally applicable to a case in which a “likelihood of 
dilution” standard is used.  This is so because it is logically impossible 
for dilution to be a likely consequence of a mere mental association if 
dilution absolutely cannot be a consequence of a mere mental 
association. 
The Court went on to assess the evidence presented by Victoria’s 
Secret (which is the same as that presented in Moseley V112 under this 
framework).  It found that the evidence showed nothing more than the 
existence of a mental association because the Colonel’s ire was directed 
only at the Moseleys for having a store name similar to that of Victoria’s 
Secret, where the Colonel’s wife and daughter shopped.  According to 
the Court, the Colonel’s regard for Victoria’s Secret and its trademark 
 110. H.R. REP. NO. 109-23, at 5, 9 (2005), reprinted in 2006 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1091, 1094, 1097. 
 111. Moseley v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 537 U.S. 418, 434 (2003), superseded by statute, 
Trademark Dilution Revision Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-312, 120 Stat. 1730, as recognized in 
Starbucks Corp. v. Wolfe’s Borough Coffee, Inc., 477 F.3d 765 (2d Cir. 2007). 
 112. Moseley, 605 F.3d at 385. 
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were unaffected by the mental association.  The Court gave no credence 
to the fact that Victor’s Little Secret had, according to the Sixth Circuit, 
lewd or sexual associations. 
Therefore, the Supreme Court’s decision in Moseley III extended far 
beyond what Congress altered by enacting the TDRA.  Moseley III 
requires that a plaintiff present at least some evidence that the consumer 
would think less of the senior trademark in order to move past a mere 
mental association and further down the road toward a likelihood of 
dilution.  Additionally, because the Court did not consider the junior 
mark’s lewd or sexual associations, even though those associations were 
evident, they should have no influence at that point in the analysis.  In 
Moseley VI, the Sixth Circuit did not just ignore the mandate of the 
TDRA when it decided to shift the burden of proof.  It also snubbed the 
Supreme Court when it based this shift merely on the existence of lewd 
or sexual associations—a consideration the Supreme Court omitted 
entirely in reaching its conclusion about whether there was anything 
more than a mental association. 
B. The Sixth Circuit’s Decision Increases the Potential for Harm to 
Consumers 
From its outset, trademark protection law was primarily concerned 
with consumer protection.113  Trademark law “was concerned foremost 
not with the senior user’s lost profits or the junior user’s unjust 
enrichment, but instead with the consumers who were ‘duped into 
dealing with an imposter.’ . . . ‘[T]he consuming public was an unnamed 
third party in every action for trademark infringement.’”114  Trademark 
infringement law, however, had a significant shortcoming—in order to 
bring a suit, the junior mark’s product had to be in direct competition 
with the senior trademark’s product.115  Therefore, it was lawful for 
producers of goods not in the same market as the goods of a senior 
trademark to benefit from the goodwill associated with the senior 
trademark.116 
This flaw of trademark infringement law was a significant catalyst 
behind the development of trademark dilution law.117  With this 
 113. Klieger, supra note 19, at 795–96. 
 114. Id. at 799 (quoting Robert C. Denicola, Trademarks as Speech: Constitutional Implications 
of the Emerging Rationales for the Protection of Trade Symbols, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 158, 160; Sidney A. 
Diamond, The Public Interest and the Trademark System, 62 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 528, 529 (1980)). 
 115. Id. at 800. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. at 801. 
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expansion, however, came the possibility that the primary justification 
for trademark protection would change from consumer protection to 
something else.118  That something else was proposed in Frank 
Schechter’s seminal article, The Rational Basis for Trademark 
Protection.  In his article, Schechter advocated for a regime of 
trademark rights in gross in which “‘the preservation of the uniqueness 
of a trademark . . . constitute[d] the only rational basis for its 
protection.’”119  In reaching this conclusion, Schechter abandoned 
trademark infringement law’s requirement that a consumer be confused 
by the junior’s use of a senior trademark.120  Schechter, instead, wanted 
to protect any unique mark against any use of that trademark, essentially 
arguing for trademark holders to have the same rights as holders of 
copyrights, patents, and physical assets.121  For Schechter, holders of 
unique marks would have a property right in gross to their trademark.122 
Schechter’s proposal was seen as radical when his article was 
published and was not immediately accepted by the judicial system.123  
Over a sixty year period, however, it slowly gained acceptance.124  As 
explained in Part II, dilution theory was initially adopted by several state 
legislatures, and in 1996, it achieved nationwide status with the 
enactment of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act.  The state antidilution 
statutes, however, were met with hostility by the courts, and judges 
narrowly interpreted their language, sometimes even ignoring the plain 
language of the statute.125  According to Robert Krieger, an attorney and 
author of a leading article on trademark dilution, a significant reason for 
this was that courts viewed these statutes not as protecting senior 
trademarks from a preventable harm, but simply as thinly veiled 
attempts to grant property rights in gross where they had not been 
before.126 
These courts were justified in their apprehension.  In addition to 
antidilution statutes being a move away from the traditional consumer 
protection justification, the granting of a trademark right in gross can 
actually harm consumers by causing an undesirable anticompetitive 
effect.  This stems from the fact that many advertisers differentiate their 
product not on quality, but on the ability of a brand’s image to appeal to 
 118. Id. at 802. 
 119. Id. (quoting Schechter, supra note 15, at 831). 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. at 816. 
 122. Id. at 805. 
 123. Id. at 810. 
 124. Id. at 811. 
 125. Id. at 814, 817. 
 126. Id. at 817. 
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the emotional, non-rational side of consumers.  The more effective a 
trademark is at appealing to this side of consumers the more appealing 
the product is to them.  And consequently, the owner of that trademark 
can charge more for its product regardless of whether that product is of 
higher quality than a competitor.  This creates an environment where a 
trademark owner has an incentive to invest in the ability of its trademark 
to have this effect.  Thus, trademark dilution law, which serves to 
protect this investment, actually encourages overinvestment in the 
development of the trademark.  This can give the owner of a famous 
trademark a monopoly-like power, because, even though a competitor 
has the funds to create a product of equal or greater quality, it will be a 
much more expensive and difficult proposition to break the 
psychological hold that a famous trademark has over its consumers.  
Without viable competition, the possessor of the monopoly power will 
have no incentive to keep prices down or to maintain product quality, 
which ultimately harms the consumer.127 
Additionally, it has been argued that the more property rights 
trademark holders are granted the more transactional costs are imposed 
on all parties.128  Because increased property rights mean more lawyers, 
longer product development time, and either more cost in developing 
trademarks or having to use capital to license an existing trademark, the 
cost of bringing a product to market, and therefore the end cost to the 
final consumer, increases.129 
In 1996, the FTDA was passed and the owners of famous trademarks 
were able to bring a dilution action in federal court without having to 
show even the likelihood of consumer confusion.  Consequently, 
significant aspects of Schechter’s proposal had found acceptance on the 
federal level,130 and a trademark right in gross was now federally 
guaranteed.131  Contrary to the interests of consumers, Congress further 
strengthened the rights of trademark owners when it lowered the 
evidentiary burden to one of likelihood of confusion with the enactment 
of the TDRA.  With the Moseley decision, the Sixth Circuit has 
expanded the power of trademark owners yet again by shifting the 
burden of proof; thus, making it easier for a senior mark to bring a 
dilution claim.  Consequently, the Sixth Circuit has made consumers 
 127. See id. at 852–66. 
 128. Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE L.J. 
1687, 1696 (1999). 
 129. Id. 
 130. The main difference between Shechter’s proposal and the FTDA was the size of the protected 
class.  Schechter wanted to define the class as “distinctive marks.”  The FTDA defined the class as those 
with “famous marks.”  “Famous marks” is a smaller class than “distinctive marks.” 
 131. Kleiger, supra note 19, at 835. 
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even more vulnerable to the harm stemming from the expansive rights 
granted to trademark holders under federal dilution law. 
C. Other Negative Consequences of Shifting the Burden of Proof 
Dilution by tarnishment, in contrast to dilution by blurring, can 
involve sometimes humorous, sometimes crude forms of ridicule, 
parody, insult, or defamation.132  Indeed, the fact situations of 
tarnishment cases have been described as “often bizarre.”133  In 
Jordache Enterprises, Inc. v. Hogg Wyld Ltd., the junior mark was 
selling pants for overweight women and calling the product “Lardache” 
jeans.134  In another case a junior mark used the slogan “Enjoy Cocaine” 
in a way that mimicked Coca-Cola’s “Enjoy Coke” slogan.135  A 
defendant, who had a booth at an adult entertainment exhibition, was 
enjoined from having two women sit atop a Viagra-branded missile.136 
The justifications for the outcomes in tarnishment cases are as 
amusing (though not as varied) as their fact patterns, but for different 
reasons.  The International Trademark Association has said that the 
results in such cases are often “dictated by a court’s eye-of-the-beholder 
reaction and sense of humor (or lack thereof).”137  Additionally, at least 
one court has suggested that “whether a particular use constitutes 
tarnishment can also vary depending on the times.”138 
The Sixth Circuit’s Moseley decision passes judgment on a specific 
segment of tarnishment cases—those involving lewd or sexual 
associations.  In support of its decision the court points to a short survey 
of tarnishment cases that, according to the court, indicate a consensus 
among other courts that a junior mark with lewd or sexual associations 
tarnishes a senior mark.  While the court’s interpretation and application 
of this litany of cases is questionable, a survey of these cases reinforces 
the observations, cited in the previous paragraph, that the outcomes are 
dictated by the mores of the deciding judge and the mores of society at a 
 132. U.S. Trademark Ass’n, Trademark Review Commission Report and Recommendations to 
USTA President and Board of Directors, 77 TRADEMARK REP. 375, 434 (1987). 
 133. Id. 
 134. 625 F. Supp. 48, 57–58 (D. N.M. 1985). 
 135. Coca-Cola Co. v. Gemini Rising, Inc., 346 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D.N.Y. 1972). 
 136. Pfizer Inc. v. Sachs, 652 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 137. U.S. Trademark Ass’n, supra note 132, at 434. 
 138. See, e.g., G.B. Kent & Sons, Ltd. v. P. Lorillard Co., 114 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953), 
aff’d, 210 F.2d 953 (2d Cir. 1954) (noting that plaintiff sought to enjoin defendant’s use of its mark on 
cigarettes and court refused to grant injunction stating that “the day has long passed when cigarette 
smoking is considered offensive and sinful”). 
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particular point in time.139 
Moreover, some of the cases also seem to indicate that a finding of 
tarnishment by a judge is a highly circumstantial type of assessment.140  
It appears to be an approach similar to the one taken by Justice Potter 
Stewart to obscenity—the “I know it when I see it” approach.141  
Whether this approach is acceptable is beyond the scope of this 
Casenote.  The fact of the matter is that judges do engage in this type of 
reasoning.  It might even be unavoidable given the subjective nature of 
some (perhaps all) areas of law. 
The Sixth Circuit’s decision takes away this discretionary function 
because it takes away a judge’s ability to analyze the interaction 
between the two marks and how that interaction affects consumers.142  
Additionally, it limits the inquiry to whether the junior mark has a lewd 
or sexual association.  It simplifies the inquiry.  One might argue that 
simplifying an inquiry that is based on the predilections of an individual 
judge might be good for the justice system, and, generally speaking, this 
is probably true.  But here it is not.  There are numerous reasons for this. 
First, the presumption errs on the side of the senior mark.  This is 
inappropriate because, as discussed above, they already have a property 
right in gross which is harmful to society, and any ruling that will make 
it easier for them to enforce this right only exacerbates the problem. 
Second, the presumption does not take into consideration the 
characteristics of the senior mark.  The image that the senior mark is 
trying to protect can have a significant impact on the effect of the use of 
an identical or similar junior mark.  As the dissenting justice in the 2010 
Moseley case pointed out, the presumption would not be appropriate if 
the senior mark also had lewd or sexual associations.  Indeed, in the 
Moseley case, the supposed wholesome nature of the Victoria’s Secret 
trademark was questionable. 
Finally, given the fact that what is considered capable of tarnishing 
depends on the times and the individual predilections of the judge, this 
kind of presumption is essentially “locking in” the mores of this 
 139. This is indicated, in part, by the lack of objective reasoning behind the decisions.  See, e.g., 
Pfizer Inc. v. Sachs, 652 F. Supp. 2d 512, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 2009); Williams-Sonoma, Inc. v. Friendfinder, 
Inc., No. C 06-6572 JSW (MEJ), 2007 WL 4973848, at *7 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 6, 2007); Kraft Foods 
Holdings, Inc. v. Helm, 205 F. Supp. 2d 942, 949–50 (N.D. Ill. 2002); Victoria’s Cyber Secret Ltd. 
P’ship v. V Secret Catalogue, Inc., 161 F. Supp. 2d 1339, 1355 (S.D. Fla. 2001); Mattel, Inc. v. Internet 
Dimensions Inc., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d 1620, 1627 (S.D.N.Y. 2000); Polo Ralph Lauren L.P. v. Schuman, 46 
U.S.P.Q.2d 1046, 1048 (S.D. Tex. 1998). 
 140. See, e.g., Kraft Food Holdings, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 949–50; Mattel, Inc., 55 U.S.P.Q.2d at 
1627; Polo Ralph Lauren, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1048; see also U.S. Trademark Ass’n, supra note 132, at 
434 (“[C]ourts will continue to make these subjective judgments on a case by case basis.”). 
 141. Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964). 
 142. See, e.g., Kraft Food Holdings, 205 F. Supp. 2d at 949–50. 
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particular judge and the mores of society at this particular point in time 
for an indefinite period.  Other societies, surely just as enlightened as 
ours (and maybe more so) have a much less uptight approach to 
sexuality.  If, at a future date, our society has become more accepting of 
sexual content, is it fair to subject it and the right to expression to an 
outdated morality?143 
V. CONCLUSION 
Almost seventy years have passed between the time when legal 
scholars first discussed dilution and when it was finally adopted on the 
federal level.  During this significant span of time, only about half of the 
states enacted laws protecting trademarks from dilution.  Moreover, state 
courts were very reluctant to apply those statutes primarily because the 
power given to trademark owners by those enactments was 
unprecedented. 
Eventually, dilution law was created on the federal level with the 
passage of the FTDA.  The Supreme Court’s reaction to the dilution 
statutes was similar to that of the state courts many years prior.  That is, 
the Court’s rhetoric in Moseley displayed an apprehension toward 
dilution law and, consequently, it applied a narrow interpretation of the 
FTDA.  Congress disagreed with the main holding of the Supreme 
Court’s Moseley decision and passed the TDRA, which states that a 
party claiming dilution need only show a likelihood of dilution in order 
to obtain an injunction.  In 2010, the Sixth Circuit adopted a very broad 
interpretation of this new statute when it decided to shift the burden to 
the defendant when that defendant has a lewd or sexual association. 
This burden shift is not provided for in the TDRA.  Nor is it in 
keeping with the Supreme Court’s tentative approach to dilution law—a 
general approach that was not negated by the TDRA.  Moreover, this 
decision has three significant negative consequences.  First, it increases 
the potential of harm to consumers by making it easier for trademark 
holders to enforce the already expansive power they have over their 
trademark (i.e., a property right in gross).  Second, it prohibits a 
consideration of the characteristics of the senior mark which can 
influence the alleged dilutive effect of the junior use of a mark.  Finally, 
 143. It is possible that a judge will be able to exercise his or her own discretion later in the 
proceedings when the defendant attempts to rebut the presumption.  But this exercise of discretion will 
probably be drastically different than one that begins without a presumption.  Moreover, at that point the 
presumption, and the morality that created it, have done significant damage.  That is, the presumption 
has increased the power of the senior mark because it has made it easier for the plaintiff to bring suit, it 
has prolonged the litigation because the plaintiff’s burden is so minimal, and it has placed the significant 
burden of proving a negative on the party that is generally less capable of bearing that burden. 
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it imposes the mores of the judge who made this particular decision and 
the mores of society at this point in time (as interpreted by this judge) on 
the courts of the Sixth Circuit in an area of law that is highly subjective 
and dependent upon an analysis of the interaction between the two 
marks and the effect of that interaction on consumers.  These significant 
problems could have been avoided if the Sixth Circuit had adopted a 
narrow interpretation of the TDRA and, consequently, had not shifted 
the burden to the defendant.  When interpreting federal dilution statutes 
in the future, courts should recognize the issues raised here and seriously 
consider using a narrow interpretive approach. 
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